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I. INTRODUCTION 
"The various forms of mental suffering are as numberless as the 
capacities of the human soul for torturing itself."1 Within the almost 
infinite variety of mental suffering, the courts have expressly recog­
nized certain categories of suffering which are compensable elements 
of damages in an action for personal injuries. Along with the mental 
distress that accompanies pain, the courts have permitted compensa­
tion for fright and shock at the time of injury, humiliation caused by 
disfigurement, anxiety over the inability to make a living and fear of 
future incapacity, disability, or death. 2 Recovery for fear of future ill­
. ness or disability is the topic of this article. Anxiety over future conse­
quences of an injury is an element of mental suffering that is 
• Principal, Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Faulkner, P.C., New 
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1. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 88, at 315 
(1935)[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. 
2. [d. at 316-317. See generally, J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY IN PERSONAL 
INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS §§ 34-44 (1972 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as STEIN]. 
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compensable.3 The development of the feared future consequence 
need not be reasonably certain or probable.4 Instead, a plaintiff is enti­
tled to recover for anxiety over the merely possible occurrence of fu­
ture disability.s Fear or anxiety over future complications arising out 
of an injury caused by the tortfeasor is not only compensable, but can 
be a substantial element of a plaintiffs damages. 
II. DAMAGES 
Before discussing the issue of compensation for fear of future dis­
ability, the purpose of damages in a personal injury action must be 
considered. The objective in any personal injury action is to compen­
sate the person injured by a tortfeasor's wrongdoing. A monetary 
award for damages is given to the plaintiff in an attempt to restore the 
injured person to his condition before he was injured.6 Thus, damages 
serve as compensation for the injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
The elements of damages recoverable in a personal injury action 
include pain and suffering, loss of earnings and impairment of earning 
capacity, and reasonable costs of medical treatment.7 The determina­
tion of damages in a personal injury action is peculiarly a function of 
the jury.s The jury has broad discretion in awarding damages: a jury 
award will be left alone unless there is a clear abuse of discretion or 
improper behavior that is prejudicial.9 
Recovery for loss of earnings and earning capacity and for medi­
cal treatment is easily understood; recovery for pain and suffering is 
not. The category of pain and suffering contains two separate ele­
ments: pain is the immediate physical effect of an injury, whereas suf­
fering concerns the resulting mental distress. 1O Although not directly 
connected to bodily injury, mental suffering accompanies pain and the 
two are difficult to distinguish. I I Thus, one who sustains bodily inju­
3. STEIN, supra note 2, § 33, at 53. 
4. Id. at § 41. 
5. Id. 
6. 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 25.1 (1956)[hereinafter cited 
as HARPER AND JAMES]; M .. MINZER, DAMAGES IN TORT AcrIONS, § 1.02, at 1-6, n. 1 
and cases cited therein. (MB 1982)[hereinafter cited as MINZER]. 
7. HARPER AND JAMES supra note 6, at §§ 25.8 - 25.10. 
8. Mansfield v. Company of New Haven, 174 Conn. 373, 374-75, 387 A.2d 699, 699 
(1978). Other jurisdictions have explained the role of the jury in determining damages in a 
similar fashion. See MINZER, supra note 6, § 1.00, at 1-4. 
9. See A. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, § 1325 (9th ed. 
1912)[herinafter cited as SEDGWICK)' 
10. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 88, at 317. 
11. Id. 
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ries is entitled as a matter of law to recover not only for pain caused by 
the injury, but for the mental suffering as well. 12 
While damages for loss of earnings or medical expenses are to 
some extent susceptible of calculation, the same is not true of damages 
for pain and suffering. 13 Pain and suffering is a peculiarly personal 
element of a plaintifrs damages and, as such, is nebulous and indeter­
minate. As explained by one commentator: "The law has no standard 
by which to measure pain and suffering in money. This must be done 
by the jury in their discretion. . . ." 14 Because of its nature, recovery 
for pain and suffering is often the largest portion of an award in a 
personal injury action. IS In a recent decision by the high court of 
Kentucky, in which a jury verdict of $390,000 was reinstated, 
$224,500 of the total award was for the plaintifrs pain and suffering. 16 
As this case illustrates, pain and suffering can be an important basis of 
recovery. 
III. DISCUSSION 
An early Connecticut supreme court decision permitted the jury 
to consider the fact of increased susceptibility to illness and the result­
ing anxiety as a distinct element of damages. In Figlar v. Gordon,17 
the court upheld a jury verdict awarding damages to a sixteen year old 
plaintiff for injuries including a depressed skull fracture and laceration 
of the brain which she sustained when she was struck by the defend­
ant's motor vehicle. IS Medical evidence was presented establishing a 
12. SEDGWICK, supra note 9, § 47, at 92. See Ramson v. N.Y. and Erie R.R., 15 
N.Y. 415, 421-22 (I 857)("That pain and suffering [are] a real and substantive injury cannot 
be disputed."); accord Merrill v. L.A. Gas & Elec., 158 Cal. 499, 512, III P. 534, 540 
(1910). 
13. SEDGWICK, supra note 9, § 41, at 46-47. 
14. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 315. 
15. E.g., Esteves v. Somco Fuel, Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) as reported in Personal 
Injury Newsletter 317 (May 11, 1981), in which the plaintiff, a 70 year old apartment build­
ing superintendent, received second and third degree burns over half of his body when an 
apartment building boiler exploded. The plaintiff, who was hospitalized for 77 days and 
had permanent nerve damage, was awarded $1,098,000; $900,000 of the total award was 
for pain and suffering. See also Martin v. New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1982), in 
which the plaintiff was shot, causing a bullet to become lodged in his neck near the spinal 
cord, creating the risk of life-threatening future complications. A jury award of $500,000 
was not excessive "in light of this emotional burden and the serious physical risk" the 
plaintiff would always have. Id. 
16. Davis v. Gravis, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984). 
17. 133 Conn. 577, 53 A.2d 645 (1947). 
18. Id. at 584, 53 A.2d at 648. The plaintiff also sustained a comminuted fracture of 
the right tibia and fibula. At the time of trial, the plaintiff walked with a limp and had a ten 
percent loss of use of the lower right leg. Id. at 584-85, 53 A.2d at 648. 
868 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:865 
possibility that the plaintiff might develop epilepsy within 10 to 15 
years following the accident. 19 In discussing the plaintiffs injuries, the 
court stated that: 
While the evidence would not justify an award of damages based 
upon the occurrence of epilepsy in the future because it went no 
further than to deal with this as a possible result, the danger that it 
might ensue was a present fact and the jury was entitled to take into 
consideration anxiety resulting therefrom. 20 
Based upon the plaintiffs injuries, including anxiety over the possibil­
ity of developing epilepsy, the jury verdict was upheld. 21 
Interestingly, the only authority cited by the Connecticut court in 
support of permitting recovery for anxiety as to future disability was 
earlier Connecticut law permitting recovery for pain and suffering in 
general.22 With little explanation the Connecticut court made a leap 
from permitting recovery for mental suffering in general terms to per­
mitting recovery for a distinct element of mental suffering: mental suf­
fering caused by fear of possible future illness or disability. 
Although not expressly explained by the court, recovery for fear 
of a future disability is a separate element of damages, distinguishable 
from recovery for the future illness or disability itself.23 Recovery for 
fear or anxiety over future complications arising out of an injury is 
allowed when there is only a possibility that the feared complication 
will occur.24 There is no requirement of certainty or probability as to 
19. Id. at 585, 53 A.2d at 648. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 585-86, 53 A.2d at 648. 
22. Id. at 585, 53 A.2d 648 (citing Orlo v. Connecticut, 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 
(1941), a case of first impressio,! permitting recovery for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress where no physical injury was sustained). The first Connecticut decision permitting 
recovery for mental suffering related to physical injury was Seger v. Barkhamstead, 22 
Conn. 290 (1853), in which the court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for his 
actual injuries and that his injuries included mental suffering. The court explained: 
His mind is no less a part of his person than his body: and the mental suffering of 
the former are often times more acute and also more lasting than those of lat­
ter... The dismay, and the consequent shock to the feelings which is produced 
by the danger attending a personal injury, not only aggravates it, but are fre­
quently so appalling as to suspend the reason and disable a person from warding 
it off; and to say, that it does not enter into the character and extent of the actual 
injury, and for a part of it would be an affront to common sense. 
Id. at 299. See also Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 377, 42 A. 67, 69 
(1899)(mental suffering is a natural and direct result of an assault and may be proved as an 
element of actual damages). 
23. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 88, at 315. See also STEIN, supra note 2, §§ 41, 42. 
24. See e.g., Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980), 
discussed infra note 51. 
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the development of the future consequence which is the source of the 
plaintitrs mental suffering.2s In contrast, recovery for the future com­
plication or disability itself i!), in most jurisdictions, predicated upon a 
showing that the future disability is medically probable or reasonably 
certain.26 Both the courts and commentators have criticized the inad­
missibility of evidence of the less than certain or probable conse­
quences of an injury. Wigmore notes that: "The courts have ... 
proceeded upon a confused apprehension of a legitimate doctrine of 
Torts, namely, that recovery may be had for such injurious conse­
quences only as are fairly certain or probable, not for merely possible 
harm."27 Wigmore concludes that the exclusionary rules should not 
be applicable to recovery of personal injury damages, inasmuch as the 
application precludes any testimony as to future illness or disability.28 
Notwithstanding such criticism and even though there has been a 
judicial movement toward a less strict standard of proof,29 most juris­
dictions continue to require medical certainty or reasonable 
probability in order for any future disability to be compensable. This, 
in part, illustrates the importance of recovery for the mental suffering 
caused by anxiety resulting from an injury. One commentator criti­
cized the reasoning of the Figlar court in permitting an award for anxi­
ety over future consequences as "seman tical shadow-boxing to escape 
the harshness of the reasonable certainty standard."30 Escaping the 
certainty standard, however, is not the reason for permitting recovery 
for anxiety. Anxiety is a separate element of a plaintitrs damages. Its 
importance rests on its nature as a peculiarly personal element of dam­
ages. Such mental suffering is clearly compensable apart from its rela­
tionship to the actual disability feared. Thus, whether or not a futur~ 
25. See e.g., Bowley v. Duca, 80 N.H. 548, 120 A. 74 (1923)(damages recoverable for 
mother's apprehension that child would be born deformed despite scientific evidence to the 
contrary). 
26. For a discussion of the related issue of recovery for future consequences of an 
illness, see Brachtenbach, Future Damages In Personal Injury Actions - The Standard 0/ 
Proof, 3 GONZAGA L. REV. 73 (1968)[hereinafter cited as Brachtenbach]. An early Con­
necticut court discussing recovery for future pain and suffering stated that: "When a plain­
tiff has by a fair preponderance of the evidence satisfied the jury that future pain and 
suffering in consequence of his injur[ies] is reasonably likely, or probable, or to be expected, 
he should be compensated for these as well as for those which are certain to occur." John­
son v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 441, 83 A. 530, 531 (1912). 
27. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 663 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
28. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1976 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
29. See e.g. Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973); 
Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967). 
30. Brachtenbach, supra, note 28 at 87. Interestingly, contrary to the author's de­
scription of the Figlar court's reasoning as a forerunner to an outright repudiation of the 
probability or certainty requirement;-the requirement has to date retained its validity. 
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injury can be established absent probability or certainty, recovery for 
fear of the possibility of future consequences remains a viable and im­
portant element of pain and suffering. 
Recovery for present anxiety over possible future illness is justi­
fied on the grounds that the plaintiff must bring an action for damages 
within the time limits fixed by law. All damages, past, present and 
future, must be determined in a single action.3! Fear of the possible 
future consequences of an injury is considered as a matter of law in 
order to make the plaintiff whole.32 As explained by one commenta­
tor: "So where one was bitten by a dog suspected of being bad, he was 
allowed to recovery for his fear of evil results ...."33 Thus, the 
plaintiff is entitled to present evidence establishing fear of future con­
sequences and is entitled to a jury charge on the subject. 34 The de­
fendant, in turn, has the right to move for a new trial on the grounds 
that a resulting jury award may be excessive.3s 
A leading argument against permitting recovery for future dam­
ages generally, and fear of future damages specifically, is that such 
damages cannot be accurately determined by the trier of fact. An 
early decision36 stated in regard to pain and suffering: It "is intangi­
ble, incapable of test or trial."37 In a divided New York decision per­
mitting damages for fear of future illness,38 the dissenting opinion 
argued that "recovery would depend upon the SUbjective mind of the 
31. 1 J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES (4th Ed. 1916); See also Filer v. N.Y. 
Central R.R., 49 N.Y. 42, 44-45 (1872); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 287, 
228 A.2d 405, 409 (1967) ("[T]he plaintiff was entitled to recover not only the damages 
which had been actually sustained ... but also compensation for future damages ...."). 
32. E.g. Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973) (condition 
of being susceptible to a disease is compensable, even absent any present harm caused by 
the possibility); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 287, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (1967) 
(nothing "evidentially improper" about admitting evidence of the plaintitrs possible devel­
opment of epilepsy after sustaining a fractured skull). 
33. SEDGWICK, supra note 9, § 47 at 76-77. Sedgwick also stated that "Mental anxi­
ety and distress, which, though the direct and natural result of the injury, are independent 
of it, are subjects of compensation." Id. Accord, MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 316; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 90S, comment e (" as an element of damages for a 
tort, one may be entitled to recover for a feeling of anxiety . . . if this is the expectable 
result of the defendant's tortious act ...."). 
34. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 663 (Chadbourn ed. 1979). See also Schwegel v. 
Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 281, 228 A.2d 405, 405. 
35. MCCoRMICK, supra note I, § 18, at 71. 
36. Southern Pacific Co. v. Hetzer, 135 F. 272 (8th Cir. 1905). 
37. Id. at 274. The court added that evidence of pain and suffering, "like that which 
convicted the alleged <Vitches, rests entirely in the belief of the sufferer and . . . is not 
susceptible of contradiction or rebuttal." Id. at 274. 
38. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. 2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249,176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958). 
See discussion of the Ferrara decision infra notes 63 & 64 and accompanying text. 
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litigating plaintiff and speculation by the physician."39 
Those courts permitting recovery for present fear of future illness 
have done so based upon common sense, which is the basis for recov­
ery for pain and suffering in general. As noted by one commentator: 
"The chief reliance for reaching reasonable results in attempting to 
value suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common 
sense of the jury ...."40 Similarly, as explained by the Oregon 
Supreme Court4I in holding that the condition of being susceptible to a 
disease is a compensable form of mental suffering: 
We believe, as a matter of common sense, that the jury can properly 
make a larger award of damages in a case involving a skull fracture 
of such a nature as to result in a susceptibility to meningitis than in 
a case involving a skull fracture of such a nature as not to result in 
such danger or risk or susceptibility.42 
So too a jury can use common sense in making a larger award for 
damages which include fear or anxiety over a future illness. 
Recent decisions have evidenced a growing acceptance of permit­
ting recovery for varied forms of mental suffering, including present 
fear of future illness.43 A plaintiff has been found to be entitled to 
damages for pain and suffering in a tort action when the pain and 
suffering is evidenced only by the plaintiirs subjective complaints.44 A 
claim of mental suffering need only be proven by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence.45 The fields of medical science and mental health 
have advanced sufficiently to permit a trier of fact to determine the 
extent of mental suffering to the same degree as physical suffering.46 
The judicial trend toward acceptance of recovery for mental suffering 
is evident from other areas of recovery in tort actions, including recov­
39. Id. at 23, 152 N.E. 2d at 254, 176 N.Y.S. 2d at 1001 (Froessel, J., dissenting). 
The dissenting opinion argued further that "legal suffering does not include mental suffer­
ing in contemplation of injury which may never develop." Id. 
40. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 319. 
41. Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675, (1973) (four year old 
was struck on head by falling cash register at the defendant's store, fracturing the child's 
skull). 
42. Id. at 412, 517 P.2d at 680. See also Smith v. Boston & Maine R.R., 187 N.H. 
246, 258, 177 A. 729, 738 (1935) (that there is a possibility of illness only does not alter 
mental suffering "unless the jury found the fear so fantastic as to make them believe that it 
was not in fact entertained. "). 
43. See STEIN, supra note 2, §§ 40-42. 
44. See e.g., De10tt v. Roraback, 179 Conn. 406, 409, 426 A.2d 791, 793 (1980). 
45. E.g. Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Conn. App. 579, 589, 481 A.2d 1286, 1292 (1984) . 
(finding error with jury charge requiring a stricter standard of proof for claims of mental 
suffering; mental suffering need only be shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence). 
46. Id. See also, Culbert v. Sampson, 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1970). 
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ery for negligently or intentionally inflicted mental suffering absent 
physical injury,47 bystander recovery,48 and recovery for traumatic 
neurosis.49 
IV. RECOVERY FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE MEDICAL CONDITIONS 
Many medical conditions are known to occur with increased fre­
quency after trauma even though they are not certain to develop. 
These include meningitis and epilepsy following injury to the head, 
sympathetic eye loss, and cancer. One of the earliest permitted 
grounds for recovery for anxiety was fear of hydrophobia resulting 
from a dog bite. 50 Several courts have permitted recovery for anxiety 
over developing these possible medical conditions following an injury 
even though the plaintiff has not established that the condition will 
develop.51 
A. Cancerophobia 
One important area of recovery is for fear of cancer, or cancer­
ophobia. As early as 1912, a North Carolina court recognized fear of 
cancer as a source of mental suffering. 52 Fear of cancer may occur 
when the plaintiff is overexposed to radiation from an x-ray or some 
other source that causes bums which in tum may result in cancer at 
some time in the future. 53 Also common is the fear of cancer after a 
47. For a general discussion of recovery for mental distress absent physical injury, 
see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 359-62 (5th ed. 1984). 
48. Id. at 365-67. 
49. E.g., Murphy v. Penn. Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980) 
($450,000 verdict for injuries arising out of a stabbing incident in the defendant's parking 
lot included damages for psychiatric changes of a permanent nature); Rennick v. Freuhauf 
Corp., 82 Wis. 2d 793, 264 N.W.2d 264 (1978) (chronic anxiety reaction caused by accident 
was compensable); Lalonde v. Weaver, 360 So.2d 542 (La. 1978). 
50. See e.g., Warner v. Chamberlain, 12 Del.(7 Houst.) 18, 30 A. 638 (1884). 
51. See text accompanying notes 54-69 infra. 
52. Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912)(testi­
mony by physician that cancer would likely follow severe molten metal burn admissible as 
tending to prove acute mental suffering). Id. at 331, 74 S.E. at 886. 
53. See e.g., Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962), in which 
the plaintiff, a physician, was awarded $25,000 for injuries to his hands resulting from his 
opening a metal cylinder containing a bottle of ethyleneimine, causing chronic ulceration 
and breakdown of the skin. The court noted that it was not clear whether the jury accepted 
the suggestion of probable future cancer or awarded compensation for the plaintiffs fear of 
developing cancer. Id. at 76, 179 A.2d at 411. See also Anderson v. Welding Testing 
Laboratory, Inc., 304 So.2d 351 (La. 1974), in which expert testimony showed that plaintiff 
was likely to develop cancer 20 to 30 years after his injury caused by handling a radioactive 
pill. In reinstating the trial court's award, which had been reduced by the appellate court, 
the supreme court noted that: 
While to a scientist in his ivory tower the possibility of cancerous growth may be 
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traumatic injury to a part of the body.54 In one case, a female plaintiff 
who was injured in an motor vehicle accident was compensated for 
anxiety over a resulting bruise on the breast bone which she feared 
would result in cancer. 55 
A recent federal decision highlights the significance of recovery 
for cancerophobia. In Weatherill v. University of Chicago,56 two fe­
male plaintiffs sought damages for injuries caused by their exposure in 
utero to diethylstilbestrol, DES, which was administered to their re­
spective mothers as part of an experiment conducted by the defendant 
university. At the time of trial neither plaintiff suffered from any can­
cerous or pre-cancerous condition. They alleged, however, that their 
prenatal exposure to DES significantly enhanced the likelihood of con­
tracting cancer in the future. The plaintiffs sought damages for their 
fear of developing cancer, not for the increased risk of cancer itself. 57 
The court held that the plaintiffs need only establish reasonable fear of 
developing cancer and were not required to establish with reasonable 
certainty that cancer would in fact develop. 58 
Compensation for fear of future complications is especially appro­
priate in actions involving prenatal exposure to DES, radiation expo­
sure, and actions for damages for asbestosis and related diseases. In a 
recent decision, the court of appeals for the fifth circuit permitted re­
covery for fear of the possibility of cancer where the plaintiff, an insu­
lation worker, had been exposed to asbestos in the course of his 
employment.59 In such instances it is possible that cancer may de­
velop in the future, although the illness may not occur for some time 
and its development is often not certain. The knowledge that cancer 
may occur at some future time is clearly a source of worry and, as 
so minimal as to be untroubling, we are not prepared to hold that the trier of fact 
erred in finding compensable this real possibility to the worrying workman, faced 
every minute of his life with a disabled and sometimes painful hand to remind 
him of his fear. 
Id. at 353. 
54. East. Ala. Express Co. v. Dupes, 271 Ala. 504, 124 So.2d 809 (1960). 
55. Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1951). 
56. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
57. Id. at 1556. 
58. Id. at 1559. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs were 
required to establish that the feared future injury was reasonably certain to develop from a 
present injury. Accord Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19-20, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 
N.Y.S.2d 996,999 (1958) (In order to recover for mental anguish a basis for "mental anxi­
ety" must be established, but the plaintiff need not prove certainty of the development of 
the illness feared.). 
59. Dartez v. Fibre Board Corp., Docket No. 83-2504 (5th Cir. July 15, 1985). 
874 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:865 
such, is compensable.60 
Often a plaintiff's fear of susceptibility to future medical disability 
is based upon a physician's disclosure of the increased susceptibility or 
possibility of illness. A physician's disclosure has been found to be a 
reasonable basis for anxiety by the injured person.61 In a New York 
case of first impression, the court noted the novelty of the wrongdoer's 
liability for "purely mental suffering arising from the information the 
plaintiff received from a doctor to whom she went for treatment of the 
original injury."62 In that case the treating physician suggested that 
radiation burns received by the plaintiff and caused by the defendant's 
negligence in taking x-rays should be checked periodically because the 
burns might become cancerous. The doctor's recommendation was 
the basis for the plaintiff's cancerophobia. The court, in a divided 
opinion, found that the second doctor's advice increased the plaintiff's 
mental anguish. Increased mental anguish is compensable to the same 
extent that subsequent physical aggravation of an injury is compensa­
ble. The New York court concluded: "[F]reedom from mental distur­
bance is now a protected interest in this state. "63 
B. Epilepsy 
Epilepsy and meningitis frequently develop following trauma to 
the head. The chances of either developing are often slight, but the 
possibility may continue for a number of years.64 In a Louisiana ac­
tion, the plaintiff sustained a cerebral concussion as a result of a motor 
vehicle accident. 65 Medical testimony was presented to the effect that 
there was a two percent to a five percent chance that the plaintiff 
would develop epilepsy in the future. 66 In upholding the jury award, 
the court explained: "While we agree. . . that Mrs. Heider has not 
proved the existence of epilepsy, we certainly concur with the trial 
judge in his conclusion that she has proved the existence of her fear of 
60. See e.g., Wetherill v. Univ. of Chicago 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1561 (E.D. Ill. 1983). 
61. STEIN, supra note 2, § 42. 
62. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 19-20, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 
996,999 (1958). See also Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 824-25131 N.W.2d 393, 402 
(1964) (disclosure by physician that in the five years following a hip fracture, the 77-year­
old plaintiff's hip may deteriorate, coupled with actual deterioration, was a reasonable basis 
for the plaintiff'S fear of future disability). 
63. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16,21,152 N.E.2d 249, 252,176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 
999 (1958). 
64. B. Jennett, Epilepsy After Blunt Head Injuries, found in LATE EFFECTS OF HEAD 
INJURY (1969). 
65. Heider v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 231 So.2d 438 (La. 1970). 
66. Id. at 441-442. 
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becoming an epileptic and its adverse effects on her."67 In a recent 
Kentucky decision, the court reinstated the jury's verdict which in­
cluded an award for pain and suffering in the amount of 
$224,500.00.68 As a result of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff in 
that case suffered a fractured skull which caused leakage of cerebral 
spinal fluid, which in tum created a possibility of future complications 
including meningitis.69 The plaintiffs constant fear that she might de­
velop meningitis and the effect of that fear upon her life justified the 
large award for pain and suffering.7o Other jurisdictions have likewise 
permitted recovery for fear of epilepsy or meningitis following head 
trauma.71 
C. Sympathetic Eye Loss 
The loss of an eye is clearly a cause for anxiety, not only because 
of the injury itself, but also because of the possible loss of the remain­
ing eye. In a recent Texas decision, a 44 year old plaintiff suffered the 
loss of his right eye during the course of surgery for reattaching the 
retina.72 At trial, the plaintiff testified that he would continue to have 
anxiety over the injury for the remainder of his life. 73 The plaintiff 
stated that he "constantly worries about something happening to his 
left eye and about what would happen if he lost his present job."74 On 
appeal the court found that the $500,000 jury verdict was not exces­
sive, considering the evidence of the plaintiffs mental anguish, which 
included worry concerning his well-being.75 In Walsh v. Brody, the 
67. Id. at 442. 
68. Davis v. Gravis, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984). 
69. Id. at 929-30. The plaintiff was advised by one physician that she should un­
dergo an operation to stop the leakage of fluid in order to avoid the possibility of meningi­
tis. A second physician warned the plaintiff against the operation because of the Iife­
threatening complications involved. Id. Thus, the plaintiff suffered from anxiety over the 
fear of meningitis, as well as anxiety about whether or not to undergo the dangerous opera­
tion. Id. at 930. 
70. Id. at 933. 
71. See also McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1962) ($40,000 
award to minor plaintiff for head injuries upheld, in part because of possibility of future 
epilepsy); Armour & Co. v. Cartledge, 176 So. 334 (1937) (jury entitled to consider possibil­
ity of future epilepsy as evidence of the plaintiirs present condition); Davis v. Gravis, 672 
S.W.2d 928, 933 (Ky 1984). 
72. Cezeaux v. Libby, 539 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1976). This was a malpractice action 
against the anesthesiologist· for failure to administer an adequate dosage of anesthesia to 
insure immobility during the operation. The plaintiff moved while a doctor had a needle in 
his eye, resulting in injury to the eye. 
73. Id. at 189. 
74. Id. The plaintiirs testimony was supported by the testimony of his physician. 
75. Id. at 189-90. 
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appellate court found error in the trial court's refusal to permit medi­
cal testimony concerning the effect of the plaintitrs eye injury caused 
by the tortfeasor on future surgery she required for a pre-existing cat­
aract.76 The appellate court ruled that the medical testimony was 
needed to establish the plaintiff's damages, including the effect of the 
injury on her anticipated cataract surgery and her claim of mental 
anxiety resulting from the injury.77 A new trial was ordered to enable 
the plaintiff to establish the effect of the eye injury on her mental 
state.78 
D. Injury to Unborn Child 
A somewhat specialized area of recovery is for the anxiety of a 
pregnant mother for fear of injury to her unborn child arising out of 
injuries to the mother herself.79 In a number of decisions, the appre­
hension of a pregnant woman that her child may be born injured or 
dead as a result of injury to the mother has been found to be an ele­
ment of damages.8o As one court reasoned, since any mental suffering 
that is a natural result of a physical injury is recoverable, the anxiety 
of an injured pregnant woman for the well-being of her unborn child 
is a natural result of the mother's injury and compensable. 8 I In 
Nomey v. Great American Indemnity CO.,82 the court increased the 
jury's award of damages to a woman, who was more than eight 
months pregnant at the time she was injured, for mental pain and anx­
iety caused by the possibility of injury to her unborn child. The court 
found the jury award inadequate on the grounds that, though the nor­
mal delivery occured eight days after the accident, the mother's anxi­
ety continued for some weeks. 83 
76. 220 Pa. Super. 293, 286 A.2d 666 (1971). 
77. Id. at 297, 286 A.2d at 669. The court stated that "(w)ithout this proof of the 
increase in hazards attendant to the cataract surgery, the jury could not properly assess 
plaintiff's claim for mental anxiety." Id. 
78. Id. at 298, 286 A.2d at 669. 
79. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 88, at 315: "[I]n case of injury to a pregnant wo­
man, the apprehension that the child will be born disfigured" is compensable. 
80. E.g., Atlanta Veterans Transportation, Inc. v. Cagle, 106 Ga. App. 551, 127 
S.E.2d 702 (1962); Davis v. Murry, 29 GA. App. 120, 113 ED 827 (1927); Prescott v. 
Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908); Feheley v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 135 P.2d 283 
(1943). 
81. Feheley v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 460-61, 135 P.2d 283, 285 (1943). 
82. 121 S.2d 763, 766 (La. 1960). 
83. Id. The court increased the jury award for anxiety from $500 to $1,000. Id. Cf. 
Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 136 S.2d 446 (La. App.1961), in which the 
court found adequate an award of $200 for the anxiety suffered by a pregnant woman for 
the health of her unborn child. Id. at 448. The court found that the plaintiff's anxiety was 
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E. Apprehension ofDeath 
Compensation may also be had for apprehension of death. In one 
Connecticut decision,84 the appellate court found no error in a jury 
charge concerning mental suffering, including fear of death.85 The de­
cedent died during the course of delivery of her child. She was con­
scious for several hours prior to death, during which time she 
complained of pain and underwent therapeutic measures and unusual 
procedures, which "may well have resulted in an apprehension of 
death."86 The court concluded that the jury could reasonably have 
inferred that the decedent suffered mental anguish because of the ap­
prehension of death.87 In a Louisiana action, recovery for apprehen­
sion of death was permitted where the decedent was hospitalized for 
41 days prior to death, during which time he worried about whether 
he would live, walk again, or father children. 88 He also had dreams 
and premonitions of death.89 
v. REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOVERY 
Some courts have permitted recovery where there is not even a 
possibility that the feared disability will develop. Unlike the case law 
discussed above, these are cases in which there is no medical evidence 
mitigated by her status as an unmarried mother who was giving birth to her fourth child in 
as many years. Id. 
In one instance, anxiety of the parents of a child born alive but potentially brain dam­
aged was included as an element of damages in a case of obstetrical malpractice. Friel v. 
Vineland and Obstetrical and Gynecological Professional Assoc., 166 N.J. Super. 579, 400 
A.2d 147 (1979). But, damages are generally not recoverable for "loss of the unborn child" 
where injuries result in a miscarriage. Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 444, 132 P.2d 114, 119 
(1942). 
84. Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 368 A.2d 172 (1972). See also Orlo v. Con­
necticut Co., 128 Conn. 231,236,21 A.2d 402,404 (1941), for earlier decisions permitting 
compensation for apprehension of death. 
85. The charge provided in part: "A person injured by the wrongdoing of another is 
just as much entitled to be compensated for mental suffering caused thereby as for physical 
suffering, including the fear that death will result." Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 655 
n.3, 638 A.2d 172, 182 n.3 (1976). 
86. Id. at 655, 638 A.2d at 182. See also, WRIGHT, CONNECTICUT JURY INSTRUC­
TIONS, § 226 (3d ed. 1981). 
87. Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 655, 638 A.2d 172, 182 (1972). Accord, Fair­
banks v. State, 143 Conn. 653, 660, 124 A.2d 893, 898 (1958)(reasonable inference that the 
plaintiff suffered mental anguish because of the apprehension of death). 
88. Roundtree v. Technical Welding & Fabrication Co., 364 So.2d 1325, 1331 (La. 
1978)(jury awarded the plaintiff a total of $668, 157.32; $125,000 of the award was for "con­
scious intense pain and suffering, emotional distress, abject fear of death and/or permanent 
paralysis." Id. at 1330-31.). 
89. Id. at 1331. The decedent also complained of pain which he described as "hell 
on earth." Id. 
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that the disability feared is related to the injury sustained as a result of 
the tortfeasor's negligence. In Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., the plaintiff 
sought damages for injuries sustained as a result of a stabbing incident 
in the defendant's parking 10t.90 The plaintiff sustained severe injuries 
to the heart, left lung, and breast. The injuries healed.91 At trial the 
plaintiff complained of fear of heart attacks, cancer, and brain damage, 
none of which had any causal connection to her physical injuries.92 
The jury was instructed that it could consider damages for pain and 
suffering and mental anguish and returned a verdict for $450,000.93 
The judgment was affirmed by the appellate court which stated that 
"in appropriate cases the plaintiff can recover substantial damages for 
a psychic injury where she has only a minor physical injury."94 Simi­
larly, a New Hampshire court permitted a plaintiff struck by a train 
while walking on railroad tracks to recover for her mistaken fear of 
paralysis, which arose after she was injured.95 
More often there is a requirement that the plaintiffs anxiety have 
some reasonable basis. In one case, the court found no error in an 
instruction to the jury requiring reasonable basis for the plaintiffs 
mental suffering.96 At least two jurisdictions, Wisconsin and New 
York, follow the rule that absent a reasonable basis for fear of future 
illness, it is against public policy to hold the original tortfeasor ac­
countable.97 In Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospitai,98 the Wisconsin court 
overturned a plaintiffs verdict in a malpractice action, finding that the 
plaintiffs cancerophobia resulting from the alleged loss of a broken 
catheter in the plaintiffs arm was too remote and that compensation 
for such fear would go against public policy.99 New York requires 
90. 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (Pa. 1980). 
91. Id. at 435, 418 A.2d at 484. 
92. Id. 
93. [d. 
94. Id. at 436, 418 A.2d at 485. 
95. Smith v. Boston & Maine Rail Co., 87 N.H. 246, 177 A. 729 (1935). The court 
explained that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for her fear that her legs might become 
paralyzed following injuries she sustained when struck by a freight train: "The fact of a 
fear so caused . . . would be an element of damages for their consideration, even though 
the fear was mistaken. That the fear regarded a possibility rather than a probability would 
not alter the reality of the mental suffering .. ,," Id. at 258, 177 A. at 738. 
96. E.g. Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 131 N.W.2d 393 (1964). See also Heider v. 
Employees Mut. Ins. Co. of Wise., 231 So.2d 438 (La. 1970) (in which the "possibility" of 
future epilepsy was well founded on medical evidence and the court held that the possibility 
could cause mental anguish). Id. at 441-42. 
97. E.g. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974); 
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E. 2d 249, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1958). 
98. 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974). 
99. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 63 Wis. 2d 515, 519 217 N.W.2d 383, 385. ct, 
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something more than a tenuous causal connection between the original 
injury and the ultimate damage for which the tortfeasor will be held 
liable. The standard applied is that liability for damages caused by 
wrong ceases at a point dictated by public policy or common sense. 100 
Thus, some courts limit recovery for anxiety by requiring some rea­
sonable basis for the fear, whereas other courts permit recovery for 
anxiety even where it has no reasonable basis. With either approach, 
the plaintiff can be compensated for a fear of future complications that 
are only possible. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The case law discussed in this article, though not exhaustive, does 
support the proposition that anxiety over the possible future conse­
quences of an injury can be an important aspect of damages in a per­
sonal injury action. Because of the personal nature of pain and 
suffering and, in particular, anxiety over future disability, an award for 
these elements of damages will vary greatly from case to case. In the 
appropriate case anxiety over possible future disability may be con­
stant and may continue for a long period of time. Such worry clearly 
affects the injured person's well-being. Anxiety can invade every as­
pect of an individual's life including his relationship to family and 
friends, employment, mental disposition, and outlook for the future. 
Anxiety over possible future disability is an element of damages the 
jury will consider and the damages awarded will reflect the plaintifrs 
anxiety. Because of the significance of the plaintiff's fear and its com­
pensable nature, recovery for such fear can make up a substantial por­
tion of a plaintiff's award. Accordingly, this element of damages 
should be explored and developed in all appropriate personal injury 
actions. 
Dickerson v. St. Peter's Hospital, 72 Wash. 2d 196,432 P.2d 293 (1967), in which the court 
permitted the jury to determine the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled 
as a result of the loss of a catheter and the resulting possibility that the catheter might be in 
the plaintiffs body. The jury could award damages for the possibility that the catheter was 
in the plaintiffs body, but could not determine whether or not the catheter was actually in 
the plaintiffs body, since the latter was too speculative. Id. at 200, 432 P.2d at 295. 
100. Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267,269, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934), cited approvingly 
in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. 2d 16, 20, 152 N.E. 2d 249,251, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 
(1958). 
